Re: switch recommendations

From: Damien Hull <dhull@digitaloverload.net>
Date: Sun Aug 28 2005 - 10:55:59 AKDT

Arthur Corliss wrote:

>On Sat, 27 Aug 2005, [iso-8859-1] dhull wrote:
>
>
>
>>I'm with you on this. OpenBSD rules!
>>
>>I should mention that I don't know much about VLAN's. Having said that I still stand by my previous statement. "Most networks don't need them."
>>
>>
>
>And I stand by mine, most of this size or greater *should* be using them.
>
>
>
>>It may add a layer of security but it's also one more thing you have to manage. A simple DMZ solution is 2 OpenBSD firewalls with a DMZ in the middle.
>>
>>
>
>Huh? At no point did anyone say that VLANs were a substitute for firewalls --
>they're not. They're simply a way to segment and manage traffic with less
>hardware, and they can make managing security easier.
>
>
>
>>INET<----->[Firewall #1]<----->[SWITCH]<----->[Firewall #2]<----->[LAN]
>> |
>> |
>> |
>> [DMZ]
>>
>>For me it comes down to two things. How much security will it give me? How much management do I have to do to get that security?
>>
>>
>
>I'm going to assume that you meant the DMZ to plug into the switch, not
>downstream of firewall #2, which is how it's showing up on my reader.
>
>
>
>>In this case were talking about a 48 port switch. Lets say we have 40 workstations. That leaves us with a few extra ports for servers etc... Lets say they have one file server that they all have access to. No amount of VLAN's is going to prevent someone on the inside from hacking the server and accessing data they shouldn't have access to.
>>
>>
>
>Yes and no. You're assuming a *very* simplistic network topology, and one
>that wouldn't fly in most enterprises with significant data assets. If
>someone has access to a server and hacks it, yes, you can assume everything on
>that server is compromised. That's common sense. But what if different
>departments have their own servers? Restricting access by network topology
>reduces your level of exposure, and therefore, your level of risk (does
>shipping really need access to accounting's data?). How about removing
>privileged services from client-side exposure altogether by putting
>them on a private backbone (whether it be database traffic, net backups, etc.,
>or even console access to the servers).
>
>
>
>>This is just my take on VLAN's. If someone can give me a reason for using VLAN's on a network with 40 workstations let me know. Again, I don't no a lot about VLAN's.
>>
>>
>
>Simple: VLANs provide performance/traffic management by isolating broadcast
>domains. Isolating broadcast domains also provide security by preventing
>information leakage from broadcast traffic. Isolating broadcast domains
>requires a non-flat network topology, and that requires either more hardware
>or VLANS. That's four reasons: performance, security, and financial, and
>administration.
>
>As you couple traffic between VLANs (such as bridging the traffic between the
>internal LAN & the Internet, the DMZ, whatever) it *should* go through a
>firewall, only instead of having to manage *two* switches (as in your example
>above) there's only one physical switch to manage. It also allows you to
>isolate your backend servers from public exposure (by using a VLAN as a
>private backbone to handle traffic between, say, a frontend application server
>on the DMZ and a database server it pulls data from).
>
>Real security is much, much more than just simple firewalls between networks,
>it's also about network topology (and about fifty other things). VLANs are
>one way to accomplish this more cost effectively since it demands less
>physical hardware and less points to manage.
>
>As others have pointed out, this does require a *good* implementation of
>VLANs. But, with a good implementation it can be an invaluable aid,
>especially for those on a budget.
>
> --Arthur Corliss
> Bolverk's Lair -- http://arthur.corlissfamily.org/
> Digital Mages -- http://www.digitalmages.com/
> "Live Free or Die, the Only Way to Live" -- NH State Motto
>---------
>To unsubscribe, send email to <aklug-request@aklug.org>
>with 'unsubscribe' in the message body.
>
>
>
>
>

Yes the DMZ should be attached to the switch.

Looks like I need to learn more about VLAN's. Can't pass up something
that could save money.

---------
To unsubscribe, send email to <aklug-request@aklug.org>
with 'unsubscribe' in the message body.
Received on Sun Aug 28 10:56:10 2005

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.1.8 : Sun Aug 28 2005 - 10:56:10 AKDT